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Abstract 
 
In February 2005, residents of Edinburgh, a medium-sized city in the United Kingdom, were given the 
opportunity to vote in a referendum on the introduction of a road user charging scheme, which had been 
in development for almost a decade. The public voted against the scheme by a ratio of 3:1 and it was 
consequently abandoned. This paper describes the evolution of the scheme, and presents results of 
research to determine the principle factors responsible for the public's overwhelming opposition to the 
scheme. The research used a postal, self-completion questionnaire that was distributed to 1300 randomly-
selected households in central and southern Edinburgh three months after the referendum. The 
questionnaire responses were analysed to assess the influence of several factors on the way respondents 
voted in the referendum. Car use was shown to be the principle determinant of voting behaviour, with car 
owners strongly opposing the scheme while non-car owners only weakly supported it. The public’s 
limited understanding of the scheme increased the strength of the opposing vote. Further, the public were 
largely unconvinced that the scheme would have achieved its dual objectives of reduced congestion and 
improved public transport. The findings suggest that more attention should have been paid to designing a 
simpler, more easily communicated, scheme and convincing residents, particularly public transport users, 
of its benefits. Some other aspects of the scheme that militated against its successful introduction are also 
briefly identified. 
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Introduction 
 
Until 25 February 2005, the City of Edinburgh in Scotland, UK, had advanced plans 
for a congestion charging scheme. However, these plans were abandoned at that time 
due to public acceptability problems and in particular to a referendum on the issue, in 
which the public overwhelmingly rejected the proposed congestion charging scheme. 
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This paper sets out the detail of the scheme and its development, and reports the results 
of a survey of Edinburgh residents, which was used to assess the importance of a range 
of factors that might have influenced the residents of Edinburgh to reject congestion 
charging in the referendum. The factors examined were: residents' habitual choice and 
frequency of use of transport mode; their understanding of the details of the scheme; 
and their attitudes towards congestion and the City of Edinburgh Council itself. 
 
 
Road user charging and public acceptability 
 
Road user charging (RUC) has recently emerged as a practical solution to the growing 
problem of congestion. Yet RUC is not a new concept. The theoretical advantage of 
RUC, namely improved economic efficiency via reduced traffic congestion, has been 
advocated by economists for decades (e.g. Pigou 1920, Vickrey 1955). Subsequently, 
transport planners have recognised the suitability of RUC, not only to improve 
efficiency, but also as a means to generate revenue and restrain the environmental 
degradation synonymous with congestion (e.g. Ministry of Transport 1964, May 1975). 
Yet with the notable exceptions of Singapore, Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and, 
most recently, London, comprehensive RUC systems implemented at the urban level 
(otherwise known as congestion charging schemes) have failed to proceed beyond the 
planning stage. Examples of schemes that never materialised proliferate: London (some 
quarter of a century prior to the successful introduction of an alternative scheme; May 
1975), Kuala Lumpar (Jones 1998), Hong Kong (Hau 1990), the Netherlands 
(Stoelhorst and Zandbergen 1990, Emmerink et al. 1995) and several proposals in the 
United States (Jones 1998). In short, RUC is frequently discussed and debated, but 
seldom implemented. While public opposition has repeatedly inhibited the introduction 
of major RUC schemes, only in the case of the City of Edinburgh were the public given 
the opportunity to vote exclusively on the issue. The fate of Edinburgh’s congestion 
charging scheme, the best part of a decade in the making, was decided by public 
referendum in February 2005. 
It is recognised that significant institutional barriers to RUC remain in many countries 
(Glazer et al. 2001, Schade and Schlag 2003). Nevertheless, most commentators now 
acknowledge that the greatest impediment to implementation is public (and linked to 
this, political) acceptability (e.g. Jones 1998, 2003, Schade and Schlag 2003, Jaensirisak 
et al. 2005). As Gray and Begg (2001) state, ‘the likelihood of large-scale, city wide 
charging being delivered successfully depends as much on local authorities winning 
“hearts and minds” (of key stakeholders, the media and, ultimately, the public), as it 
does on producing an integrated transport strategy or overcoming any technical 
difficulties’. In a democratic society, ‘societal, political and technological innovations 
must be introduced via the democratic process and must prevail against competing 
innovations’ (Schade and Schlag 2003). As Edinburgh can now testify, RUC, like other 
innovations, can rarely be imposed against the public will. 
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The City of Edinburgh’s proposed congestion charging scheme 
 
Transport governance in Scotland and Edinburgh 
 
The City of Edinburgh is located in the south-east of Scotland; it has a population of 
450000 and covers an area of 262 square kilometres (Marsden and May, 2004). 
Edinburgh is a unitary local authority, which is answerable directly to the devolved 
government for Scotland (the Scottish Parliament and Executive). There is no formal 
regional authority for transport since the local government reorganisation of 1996. 
However, a voluntary regional partnership, South East Scotland Transport Partnership 
(SESTRAN), exists and produces a Regional Transport Strategy. 
There are three tiers of directly elected politicians. Local politicians, serving the City 
of Edinburgh Council and (excluding European representation) two layers of national 
government with Members of the Scottish Parliament and Members of the UK 
Parliament. The City of Edinburgh Council has established an ‘arms-length’ delivery 
company (TIE Limited) that has been given responsibility for managing the 
implementation of major infrastructure schemes, integrated ticketing and congestion 
charging (Marsden and May, 2004). Decisions taken by TIE must be ratified by the City 
Council, although TIE itself is accountable to a majority private-sector board, though 
funded wholly by the Council and the Scottish Executive (devolved government). It 
should also be noted that the City of Edinburgh is surrounded by other local authorities, 
many of whose residents commute to Edinburgh for employment. 
Edinburgh has a rapidly expanding economy and is the focus of regional economic 
development. The Regional Transport Strategy states that it ‘focuses more on strategic 
links to the capital in order to improve connections to Edinburgh as it is the focus of 
jobs and services within the SESTRAN area’. In this regard, Edinburgh parallels other 
regional cities in being the focus for the economic development strategy, from which 
the surrounding areas will benefit. Because of this economic growth, traffic congestion 
caused by commuting – especially in and from the west of the city – was perceived by 
the Council to be a serious problem and one that needed to be dealt with by means of a 
congestion charging scheme. 
 
 
Details of the scheme proposed for Edinburgh 
 
The final proposal consisted of an inner and outer cordon, as shown in Figure 1. 
The system was to be operational on weekdays only, with a once-a-day charge of £2 
(maximum) for crossing one or both cordons in an inbound direction. The outer cordon 
would charge trips from 0700 to 1000, whilst the inner cordon would charge trips 
between 0700 and 1830. No residents’ discount was proposed, other than for those City 
of Edinburgh residents living outside the outer cordon. They would have been exempt 
from the outer cordon charge only. Exemptions would have been in place for people 
with mobility impairments, emergency vehicles, taxis, buses and motorbikes. 
There would have been no charge for driving wholly within one cordon or between 
cordons – this is a clear difference between the proposed Edinburgh and the successful 
London scheme. The reason for the choice of a twin cordon rather than area licence 
scheme was complex. Qualitative appraisal work carried out in 1999 found that multiple 
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cordon, screenline or area licence schemes would be more effective in traffic reduction 
terms than simple cordon schemes, but scored them low in relation to their public 
acceptability and ease of implementation. Modelling work carried out in 2001 and 2002 
considered variations on only two basic options: a city centre cordon, and a city centre 
plus outer cordon. In congestion management and traffic reduction terms the outer 
cordon had a somewhat greater predicted impact than a single inner cordon, but it was 
predicted to generate twice as much revenue (TIE, 2002). Perhaps for these reasons, as 
the plans for the scheme progressed, they were expanded to include an outer as well as a 
city centre cordon. 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Edinburgh showing the network of major roads (grey) and the location of the proposed 
inner and outer charging cordons (black). The numbered circles show the location of charging entry 
points in the outer cordon. The diameter of the mapped area is approximately 16 km (adapted from CEC, 
2004b). 
 
 
This was also a politically expedient decision, since an area licence as in London 
would have affected many more Edinburgh residents (and therefore voters). In contrast, 
as proposed, the outer cordon would have mainly affected drivers from surrounding 
local authority areas, particularly those who commute into Edinburgh for work. 
However, this led to difficult relations with neighbouring local authorities, who 
perceived the scheme as unfairly penalising their residents, while not effectively 
controlling congestion, as Edinburgh residents could drive freely within the area 
between the inner and outer cordons without being subject to any charge. 
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Payment was to have been made at paypoints in retail outlets, by mobile phone Short 
Message Service (text messaging), on the Internet or via a telephone call centre. 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology (ANPR) was to have been employed 
for enforcement purposes. A vehicle whose number plate was registered on the database 
as having paid for that day would then have any record of its passing a cordon point 
immediately erased from the system. Vehicles for which there was no record of 
payment, and which crossed one or both cordons, would have had their numbers 
retained in the system and, ultimately, a penalty notice would have been issued for non-
payment. The choice of technology was influenced by considerations of cost and 
practicality and by what was to be used in London. The biggest challenge for the system 
would have been to keep operating costs to around £0.67 per charge payer, thus 
retaining around 66% of the charge to spend on transport improvements. This contrasts 
with an operating cost of £2.67 per £5.00 charge in London. At the time of the 
referendum, the actual cost of operating the Edinburgh scheme had not been confirmed. 
 
 
The predicted effects of the congestion charging scheme on traffic and transport 
 
Traffic modelling forecast the following benefits, by 2011, compared with the do-
nothing situation (TIE, 2002): 
 
• A 21% reduction in city centre traffic delays. 
• A 9% reduction in traffic delays city-wide. 
• A 30% reduction in vehicles entering the city centre on a typical weekday, and 
an 8% reduction across the outer cordon. 
• Increases of 22% and 8% in numbers of people entering the city centre and the 
city as a whole (respectively) by public transport on a typical weekday. 
 
Over the modelled 20 year life of the scheme, it was predicted that it would raise £706 
million at 2002 prices. The significant additional transport improvements that were 
forecast to be funded from this revenue included: 
 
• Around £200 million for additional bus services. 
• £154 million for a tram line to southeast Edinburgh. 
• £111 million for additional road maintenance. 
• £147 million for regional rail improvements. 
• £17 million for additional accessible transport. 
• £24 million for road safety projects. 
 
It is a possible criticism of the scheme that, at the time of the referendum, plans for 
these schemes were not well-developed and therefore quite difficult to “sell” to the 
public. In particular, there was some doubt over the level of bus service that could be 
secured for the amount available. 
A further issue that generated criticism was the nature of the projects that were to be 
put in place before the congestion charging scheme was due to start, that is, prior to 
April 2006. Such projects were required in order to satisfy the Scottish Executive’s 
policy guidance that a range of public transport improvements should be in place before 
charging was introduced. Between 2002 and 2006, the City Council has, or will have, 
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spent £100 million on projects in an attempt to meet this requirement. These included a 
new bus station, three new rail stations and a cross-city rail service, real-time bus 
information, a short section of guided busway, four park and ride sites, and extensive 
bus priority on most radial road corridors. Critically, however, it was not possible for 
the City Council to fund additional bus services prior to the introduction of congestion 
charging, since (without congestion charging) it is dependent on the Scottish Executive 
for transport funding. For macro-economic reasons, most additional funding for 
transport from the Scottish Executive has been in the form of capital money, for 
infrastructure investment, and not revenue for the subsidy of additional services. 
Therefore, the Council was necessarily limited in what it could do to put public 
transport improvements in place prior to the introduction of congestion charging, and 
was open to criticisms from many residents that the £100 million of improvements were 
of little use to them, because they were, in many cases, geographically specific. Had 
revenue funding been available, the Council could have improved bus services on an 
area-wide basis (as was the case prior to the introduction of congestion charging in 
London, where the Mayor has control of bus services, unlike in all other parts of Britain 
outside London). 
 
 
Public consultation and referendum 
 
Although the Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 introduced legislation which permitted 
local authorities to impose congestion charging on public roads, the City of Edinburgh 
Council (and its predecessor Lothian Regional Council) had already been contemplating 
such a scheme for several years (Begg et al. 2004). A New Transport Initiative (NTI), 
and later an Integrated Transport Initiative (ITI) sought to refine the abstract concept of 
congestion charging into a more definite proposal. Between 1999 and 2003, five phases 
of public consultation were undertaken (by the Council and, latterly, TIE Limited) to 
determine the acceptability of the proposals. 
Phase IV (2002) was the most comprehensive of the consultation phases, with 240000 
leaflets distributed through a variety of media to residents of south-east Scotland. 
Residents were asked whether they supported or opposed three different scenarios: a 
single cordon congestion charging scheme, a double cordon scheme, or no charging. 
Just 34% of Edinburgh residents supported the proposed double cordon scheme. 
Nevertheless, with slight modifications, the Council opted to proceed with this option, 
‘due to this design’s ability to influence city-wide congestion levels and to fund region-
wide traffic improvements’ (PRoGRESS 2004). By phase V (2003), support amongst 
Edinburgh residents for the proposed double cordon scheme had increased very slightly 
to 36%. Following a Public Inquiry, the scheme was finalised and proceeded to a public 
referendum. 
It is interesting to ask why a public referendum was held in Edinburgh, after the 
successful introduction of congestion charging in London (February 2003) without a 
public referendum. Despite interviewing the key actors involved, it has proved 
impossible to obtain a clear answer to this question. Upon granting ‘Approval in 
Principle’ for the City of Edinburgh Council’s congestion charging proposal, the 
Scottish Executive stated: ‘At the Approval in Detail stage, you should be able to 
demonstrate clear public support for the scheme’ (Scottish Executive, 2002). However, 
the Council had, at its meeting on 17 October 2002, already taken the decision that 
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‘clear public support’ could be demonstrated by means of a referendum (CEC, 2002). 
Rye et al. (2005) therefore suggest that the decision to hold a referendum was not 
necessarily a response to the Scottish Executive’s stated requirement. Rather, they 
suggest that the decision was in response to the press and public criticism that the 
Council had received in relation to the consultation exercises undertaken during 2002. 
Saunders (2005) was more explicit: ‘the referendum was not necessary… it was a 
political decision taken to diffuse opposition [to the scheme] as a local election issue in 
2003’. 
The public referendum was conducted by post in February 2005. Edinburgh residents 
(only those on the edited electoral register or those that had otherwise registered to vote) 
were asked to vote on the Council’s ‘preferred’ strategy: congestion charging and 
increased transport investment funded by the revenue raised by congestion charging. 
The participation in the vote was 179905 residents, a turnout of 61.8% of those 
registered. There were 133678 votes against and 45965 in favour. This represented a 
74.4% public rejection of the proposal. Consequently, the proposed scheme, and indeed 
the entire concept of congestion charging in Edinburgh, was abandoned and instead a 
‘base’ investment package has been adopted. A new Local Transport Strategy, without 
charging, is likely to be produced by the end of 2006. 
 
 
Research methodology 
 
A questionnaire was designed for completion by residents of Edinburgh to investigate 
their voting behaviour in the referendum on the congestion charging proposals. The 
questionnaire consisted of 21 questions designed to elicit information on the residents' 
use of transport modes, most frequent journey, voting behaviour in the referendum, 
understanding of and attitude towards the congestion charging scheme, and 
demographic details. All questions were multiple choice, with the exception of one 
question inviting further comments from respondents. 
For practical reasons, and to ensure a sufficient spatial density in the data collected, an 
analysis of the entire city was rejected in favour of a specific study area from within the 
city boundaries. The study area consisted of a transect from central to south Edinburgh 
(six adjacent city electoral districts each with a population of around 7000) specifically 
selected as being representative of the demography and transport provision of the city as 
a whole. In May 2005, the questionnaire was sent by post to 1300 residents in the study 
area, randomly selected from the unedited electoral register (thus including potential 
voters, registered to vote in the referendum or otherwise). A response rate of 25.8% was 
achieved, with 336 residents returning useable responses in the reply-paid envelopes 
provided. Proportionally fewer responses were received from two lower income areas, a 
problem countered by making house-to-house calls to elicit further responses. The final 
dataset comprised 368 completed questionnaires. 
The representativeness of the sample was checked by comparison with census data for 
Edinburgh (CEC, 2001). The sample included an approximately equal number of males 
and females, consistent with the census data. Similarly, the age distribution of the 
sample was comparable with the census data. However, as regards housing tenure, 
outright owners were over-represented, with a subsequent under-representation of those 
residing in social rented housing. This misrepresentation was primarily due to 
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differential response rates. In addition, 79.3% of respondents owned or shared a car or 
van, an over-representation in comparison to Edinburgh as a whole, as shown by a 
survey average of 1.27 cars per household, somewhat higher than the 0.81 cars per 
household for the entire city (CEC, 2001). 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The influence of transport mode and frequency of use on voting behaviour 
 
Table 1: The influence of car ownership on turnout and non-participation of respondents in the Edinburgh 
congestion charging referendum. 
Car ownership         Turnout Chose not to vote Not registered to vote 
Own or share a car or van 81.6% 10.1% 8.3% 
Do not own or share a car or van 67.6% 17.6% 14.9% 
 
 
The simplest means of defining car availability is whether the respondent owns or 
shares a car or van (this will henceforth be referred to simply as car ownership). Table 1 
shows that more than 80% of car-owning respondents participated in the referendum. 
This is a substantially higher turnout than was witnessed amongst non-car-owning 
respondents, nearly a third of whom failed to use their vote. Clearly the motivation to 
vote in the referendum was greater amongst car owners. 
 
Table 2: Influence of car ownership on the proportion of respondents voting for and against congestion 
charging in the Edinburgh referendum. 
Car ownership       Voted for     Voted against 
Own or share a car or van 24.7% 75.3% 
Do not own or share a car or van 64% 36% 
 
The disparity in turnout between car owners and non-car owners would only have 
been important to the referendum result if there was also a disparity in the voting 
behaviour of the two groups. Table 2 shows that there was an enormous difference in 
the voting behaviour of respondents according to car ownership. Car owners were 
overwhelmingly opposed to the proposal, whereas non-car owners registered net 
support. Moreover, there was an inequality in the strength of these voting preferences: 
 
• For every 1 car owner supportive of the proposal, 3.05 were opposed; 
• For every 1 non-car owner opposed to the proposal, only 1.78 were supportive. 
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Figure 2: Graphs showing the voting behaviour of respondents in the Edinburgh congestion charging 
referendum by their frequency of use of each of the major transport modes. The outputs of chi squared 
statistical tests of significance are shown beside the title of each graph. Graphs of the voting behaviour of 
respondents using motorcycle, train or taxi are not included due to insufficient respondents using these 
modes. 
 
In short, not only were car owners more likely to vote, their opposition to the proposal 
was far stronger than the support offered by non-car owners. 
Voting tendencies, by frequency of use for each of the major transport modes in 
Edinburgh, are shown in Figure 2. The pattern of voting behaviour of car-driving 
respondents shows a strong and highly significant (p < 0.01) variation with frequency of 
car use. Frequency of car use may be regarded as a measure of a respondent’s reliance 
upon the car. Figure 2 strongly suggests that the greater the reliance on car driving, the 
greater the opposition to congestion charging, and the greater the voter turnout. 
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Considering only those most reliant on the car, namely daily car users living in a 
household with two or more cars (25.7% of the entire sample), then a turnout of 87.1% 
was found, with seven times as many respondents voting against charging as voting for. 
Regular car passengers were slightly more opposed (p < 0.05) to congestion charging, 
as drivers were themselves. 
Figure 2 shows a highly statistically significant (p < 0.01) pattern of voting behaviour 
of respondents with frequency of bicycle use, the pattern being the opposite of that 
found for car drivers. Daily cyclists were strongly supportive of congestion charging, 
although weekly cyclists were equivocal and occasional cyclists showed net opposition. 
Opinion among regular bus users was equivocal verging on opposed (p < 0.01). Indeed, 
just 31.9% of daily bus users, perhaps the group likely to benefit most from congestion 
charging, supported the proposal. Almost as many, 29.8%, failed to vote at all. Even 
restricting consideration to those daily bus users who were not car owners, only 34.6% 
voted in favour, fewer than the number that didn’t use their vote. 
Whereas the lack of support amongst car users is to be expected, the net opposition 
amongst bus users was really surprising. It would appear that bus users did not perceive 
the referendum to be relevant to them. Turnout was relatively low amongst bus-using 
respondents, perhaps because they did not understand or believe in the benefits that 
congestion charging and the associated public transport improvements could bring to 
them. The socioeconomic profile of the bus users probably also tended to produce the 
lower turnout compared to car users. However, despite a significant financial outlay, it 
seems that the Council may have failed to effectively communicate the significance of 
the referendum vote to bus users. More importantly, of those bus users that did vote, 
support was far from guaranteed. The proposal even failed to convince non-car owning, 
daily bus users. In the case of bus users, a natural opposition to increased costs cannot 
be used to explain the significant levels of opposition. There must have been 
considerable reservations with the proposal, and perhaps some scepticism that the 
promised reduction in congestion and improvements in public transport provision would 
actually be achieved. 
 
 
The influence of public understanding of the proposed scheme on voting behaviour 
 
The study tested the public’s understanding of two aspects of the proposed congestion 
charging scheme: 
 
• The level of the charge 
• The applicability of the charge to each respondent’s most frequent journey. 
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Figure 3: Percentage frequency distribution of respondents' responses to the question: 'If the congestion 
charging scheme had been introduced, what would the maximum daily charge have been?'. Depends 
refers to: ‘Depends on whether you entered a charging area more than once’. 
 
 
If the scheme had been introduced, the congestion charge would have been set at £2. 
This represented a maximum amount chargeable per day, regardless of how many times 
either cordon was crossed. Respondents were asked: 'If the congestion charging scheme 
had been introduced, what would the maximum daily charge have been?'. Figure 3 
shows the percentage frequency distribution of responses to this question. The peak at 
£2 is immediately obvious. However, this represents less than half (47.8%) of 
respondents who correctly stated the charge at £2. Interestingly, 13.9% of respondents 
thought the charge would have been less than £2. It is conceivable that a small 
proportion of this figure consists of respondents who misread the question as ‘what 
would you like the maximum daily charge to have been’. Naturally, for most people this 
would have been as low as possible. 
A greater proportion, 20.2%, thought the charge would have been more than £2. This 
may have resulted from confusion with the Central London scheme. Indeed, in the run-
up to Edinburgh’s referendum, it was announced that the London charge was set to 
increase from £5 to £8. This served to nourish a belief that Edinburgh’s charge would 
rise (‘unfairly’) too, despite a commitment to only increase it by the ‘percentage uplift 
in accord with changes in the retail price index’ (Begg et al. 2004). 
Perhaps the greatest individual misconception uncovered by Figure 3 is the belief held 
by 18.2% of respondents that the maximum daily charge was dependent on whether a 
charging area was entered more than once. This suggests that they perceived the charge 
to be applicable an unlimited number of times per day. In the light of this 
misconception, it is unsurprising that these residents opposed the scheme by a ratio of 
3.5:1. 
 
Table 3: The influence of correctness of understanding of the level of the daily congestion charge on the 
voting behaviour of respondents in the Edinburgh referendum. The difference in the voting behaviour 
between the two groups was not statistically significant. 
Understanding of the level of the charge            Voted for     Voted against 
Charge correctly identified as £2 35.0% 65.0% 
Charge incorrectly identified 28.5% 71.5% 
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Table 3 shows the impact of misperceptions regarding the level of the charge on the 
voting behaviour of respondents. It is evident that those with a misconception over the 
level of the charge were slightly more opposed to the scheme than those with an 
accurate understanding. Nevertheless, opposition was still substantial amongst those 
respondents aware that the charge would have been £2. Misperceptions regarding the 
level of charge were therefore not the sole reason for the public rejection of the 
proposal. It was however, one of a number of contributory factors that served to 
increase opposition to the scheme. 
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Figure 4: Percentages of respondents believing that they would or would not have been charged for their 
most frequent journey under the Edinburgh congestion charging scheme ('Perception') compared to the 
actual percentages of respondents that would or would not have been charged ('Reality'). 
 
 
Respondents were asked to provide details of their most frequent journey. They were 
then asked whether they thought the proposed charge would be applicable to their 
journey, if they used a car to make that journey. Using a route planner and an accurate 
knowledge of the scheme, each respondent's perception of the applicability of the 
charge to their most frequent journey was checked against reality. Figure 4 shows the 
comparison between the respondents' perception and reality. Just over a third (34.9%) of 
respondents would have been liable to pay the charge, if they used a car for their most 
frequent journey. Yet substantially more residents thought they were liable to have been 
charged than was actually the case. While few respondents (6%) were unaware that they 
were liable to be charged, 20.2% of respondents wrongly thought they would have been 
charged for their journey. The respondents' misconception therefore tended to 
exaggerate the applicability of the charge beyond what was actually the case. 
Very few respondents made their journey outside of charging hours, so imperfect 
knowledge of this feature of the scheme cannot account for the widely held 
misperceptions over the applicability of the charge. It seems likely that the single 
greatest source of confusion regarding the applicability of the charge was a 
misconception that the cordons were operational in both directions. There was a widely 
held belief that journeys crossing either the inner or outer cordon in an outbound 
direction would be subject to a charge. Of those respondents whose journey quite 
obviously crossed the outer cordon in an outbound direction (i.e. those travelling to a 
non-Edinburgh postcode), 37% wrongly thought that they would be charged. 
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Table 4: The influence of correctness of understanding of the applicability of the congestion charge to 
each respondent's most frequent journey on their voting behaviour in the Edinburgh referendum. The 
difference in voting behaviour between the two groups is statistically significant (χ2 = 4.432; df=1; 
p<0.05). 
Understanding of applicability of charge Voted for Voted against 
Correct 36.0% 64.0% 
Incorrect 22.1% 77.9% 
 
Table 4 shows the effect that the misperception of the applicability of the charge had 
on respondents' voting behaviour in the referendum. The strength of opposition was 
significantly (p < 0.05) greater amongst those respondents with an incorrect 
understanding of the applicability of the charge. Indeed, if we consider for a moment 
only those that thought they would have been charged, when in fact they wouldn’t, 
opposition increases to 80.8%. The divergence in voting behaviour between the 
respondents with a correct understanding and those with an incorrect understanding was 
greater in Table 4 than is evident in Table 3. This suggests misconceptions over the 
applicability of the charge had a greater effect on the referendum result than those 
concerning the level of the charge. However, net opposition to the scheme is apparent 
regardless of the understanding of the applicability of the charge. This again suggests 
that this misconception was a contributory, rather than the fundamental, factor in the 
public rejection of congestion charging. 
It seems logical that the greatest source of confusion was the scheme itself. The 
Edinburgh proposal, with its double cordon, inbound only charging system, with 
exemptions for ‘outer Edinburgh residents’ (but only for the outer cordon), was simply 
too complex for the public to grasp. There were of course technical justifications for the 
complexity of the proposal. What is more, the Public Inquiry found in favour of 
retaining the vast majority of the scheme details (Begg et al. 2004). Yet, despite the 
decision to hold a referendum on the introduction of the scheme, there appeared to be 
insufficient consideration of the impact of the complexity on how people would vote. If 
anything, the scheme became more complicated and confusing as the referendum 
approached, as the Council made desperate final concessions (e.g. proposing one hour’s 
free city centre parking for those who had paid the charge) in an attempt to gain greater 
support. A simpler scheme may not have so effectively fulfilled the dual objectives of 
reduced congestion and revenue generation. Yet it almost certainly would have 
produced greater public support, by avoiding opposing votes from residents who 
erroneously believed that they would be subject to the charge. 
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The influence of public attitudes to congestion and to the City of Edinburgh Council on 
voting behaviour 
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Figure 5: Percentage frequency distribution of respondents' level of agreement with the statement: 
'Congestion is a problem in Edinburgh'. 
 
It is interesting to consider whether the Edinburgh public’s perception of the level of 
congestion in the city matched that of the Council’s, who considered it serious enough 
to propose congestion charging. Respondents were asked their level of agreement with 
the statement: ‘congestion is a problem in Edinburgh’. The percentage frequency 
distribution of responses by level of agreement is shown in Figure 5. A large majority 
(74.7%) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that congestion is a problem in 
Edinburgh. Unsurprisingly, those who voted in favour of the congestion charging 
scheme were strongly in agreement that congestion is a problem. Of greater 
significance, those who were opposed to the proposal actually still tended to agree that 
congestion is a problem. 
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Figure 6: Percentage frequency distribution of respondents' level of agreement with the statement: 'If 
congestion charging had been introduced, it would have significantly reduced congestion in Edinburgh'. 
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The questionnaire included questions to assess whether the respondents were 
convinced that the proposal would be able to achieve its two principle aims: to reduce 
congestion; and to improve public transport, using the revenue generated (CEC 2004a). 
Figure 6 shows that considerably fewer than half (37.4%) of the respondents expressed 
confidence that the scheme would have significantly reduced congestion. 
A common criticism of the scheme was that many drivers would simply have altered 
their route, in order to avoid crossing the inner cordon, the effect being merely to 
displace rather than reduce congestion. Thus there was a perception that the scheme 
would have failed to reduce congestion between the two cordons (i.e. in the suburbs). 
Although proponents may argue that the outer cordon would have reduced the total 
number of vehicles entering the city, the fact remains that if Edinburgh residents had 
wanted to make a trip entirely between the cordons, there would have been no charge 
payable to discourage them from using their cars. Of course, charging for such journeys 
would have been likely to reduce public acceptability even further. Nevertheless, the 
perception that congestion levels were unlikely to improve outside of the city centre was 
a major constraint to the perceived effectiveness of the proposal. 
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Figure 7: Percentage frequency distribution of respondents' level of agreement with the statement: 'If 
congestion charging had been introduced, it would have led to a big improvement in public transport'. 
 
 
Apparently unconvinced by the effectiveness of charging to reduce congestion,  
Figure 7 shows that respondents were equally sceptical of any improvements in public 
transport that the scheme may have induced. Despite a great deal of uncertainty, it is 
apparent that an overall majority of respondents disagreed with the statement that 
congestion charging 'would have led to a big improvement in public transport'. Indeed, 
just 28.9% of residents agreed with the statement. A number of factors may account for 
this high degree of scepticism. Firstly, 56.3% of residents already considered public 
transport to be ‘a good standard’. This would perhaps imply that a ‘big improvement’ 
would not be possible. While this argument would seem to infer that the Council was a 
victim of its own success, a more realistic explanation relates to the issue of trust. Just 
14.4% of respondents agreed that ‘the Council’s transport policy in the last ten years has 
been successful’. Similarly, only 16.8% agreed that ‘the Council can be trusted to 
improve the welfare of Edinburgh residents’. The negativity expressed towards the 
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Council’s preceding transport policies (apparently despite a positive perception of 
public transport) would be unlikely to induce much confidence that substantial 
improvements would be forthcoming. This was not helped by the ill-defined nature of 
the proposed public transport improvements; Saunders (2005) accepted that many of the 
proposals were ‘vague and non-specific’. 
To assess the effect of respondents' perceptions of the effectiveness of the scheme on 
voting behaviour, they were divided into three groups, namely those who stated that the 
scheme would: 
 
• Reduce congestion and improve public transport (achieve both objectives); 
• Reduce congestion or improve public transport (achieve one objective); 
• Neither reduce congestion nor improve public transport (achieve no objectives). 
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Figure 8: The voting behaviour of respondents grouped according to the number of objectives they felt 
the Edinburgh congestion charging scheme would have achieved. 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the voting behaviour of respondents falling into each of these groups. 
It is interesting to note that net opposition was only witnessed amongst respondents who 
stated that the scheme would achieve neither of its main objectives. Amongst 
respondents who expressed confidence that the scheme would achieve one objective, 
but fail in the other, support for the proposal outweighed opposition by a ratio of around 
1.7:1. This would suggest that, to have gained over 50% support in the referendum, it 
was not necessary to propose a perfect scheme. It was merely necessary to present one 
where a majority of residents could perceive a single, major, tangible benefit. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has described the design and development of the proposed Edinburgh 
congestion charging scheme, noting several aspects which militated against its eventual 
introduction. There was no single implementing agency for the scheme. It was very 
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much dependent on the Scottish Executive for funding, and the bus and rail operators to 
undertake to improve public transport services prior to the introduction of the scheme. 
In addition, the delivery of public transport improvements outside the City of Edinburgh 
was dependent on neighbouring authorities, many of whom were hostile to the 
congestion charging scheme. The perception of surrounding local authorities was that 
the scheme (especially the outer cordon) was set up in such a way so as to charge their 
residents, whilst allowing City of Edinburgh residents to drive without paying, even 
though both groups could be seen to be contributing to congestion. Many people viewed 
the scheme as aimed only at revenue raising; moreover, they did not trust the Council to 
spend the revenue correctly. Further barriers to the implementation of the scheme, 
mainly related to local political issues, inadequate resourcing of the planning phase and 
complexity of the legislative framework are detailed by Rye (2005). 
A lack of public acceptability has been widely acknowledged as the single greatest 
barrier to the implementation of road user charging (e.g. Jones 1998, 2003, Schade and 
Schlag 2003, Jaensirisak et al. 2005). This paper has presented the results of research to 
evaluate the importance of a number of factors that contributed to the lack of 
acceptability of the proposed scheme in Edinburgh, which ultimately manifested itself 
in the public's rejection of the scheme in the referendum. 
The principal determinant of voting behaviour was car use. In short, and with 
exceptions, car owners opposed the scheme while non-car owners supported it. Car 
owners did not appear to recognise, nor appreciate, the potential benefits that congestion 
charging may have brought about. While reduced congestion and improved alternatives 
to the car were abstract possibilities, the prospect of being charged was very much more 
tangible. Indeed, not only was it tangible, but it was perceived to be more costly, and 
more frequently applied than would actually have been the case. Only a small minority 
of car owners were willing to embrace the concept of charging. Yet critically, support 
amongst public transport users was not nearly as reliable, or as enthusiastic, as the 
opposition of motorists. 
While natural opposition to an increase in the cost of car travel was fundamental to 
the public’s rejection of the proposal, opposition was clearly exacerbated by the 
limitations of the scheme. It was clear that it was too complicated to be understood, 
never mind supported, by a majority of the public. Although the public accepted that 
congestion was a significant and growing problem, they were unconvinced that the 
proposal represented an effective means of combating it. Indeed, the planned public 
transport improvements were perceived by many as arriving too late; and by others as 
insufficient, irrelevant, or ill-defined. The importance of this last point is rather 
compounded by an apparent widespread distrust of the Council. Considering that a 
referendum was ultimately held, the scheme should perhaps have been designed with a 
greater consideration for public acceptability. Strong public opposition to a double 
cordon scheme was evident as early as 2002. 
This study suggests some lessons for other cities considering the introduction of RUC 
as a means to solve the problem of traffic congestion. Firstly, the design of schemes 
should avoid unnecessary complexity. The findings of this study clearly show that in the 
Edinburgh case the strength of the negative vote was enhanced by residents' 
misunderstanding of the scheme, causing a substantial number to believe that the daily 
charge would be both higher, and applied more frequently, than in reality. These 
individuals might conceivably have voted for the scheme if they had understood the 
details clearly. Secondly, while the strong opposition arising from the narrow economic 
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self-interest of motorists is unsurprising, the weakness in support for the scheme from 
bus users who stood to gain from the public transport improvements that would have 
been funded by congestion charging was unexpected. This appears to have arisen from 
apathy, a lack of belief in the success of the proposed public transport improvements 
and a lack of trust in the City of Edinburgh Council. This suggests that the promoters of 
RUC need to engage strongly with public transport users using participative 
consultation processes to build ownership and trust, and show the flexibility and 
willingness to incorporate the outcomes of these processes into the final proposal. 
Furthermore, effective strategies should be developed to actively communicate the 
benefits of congestion charging to public transport users, building stronger support 
amongst a constituency that ought to be favourable, and thereby counterbalancing the 
inevitable opposition from motorists. 
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